Where is katanga

I heard them issue an ultimatum, over a loudspeaker…They gave the Katangans an ultimatum to surrender and leave the post office.

When the Katangans refused, the Indians started to shoot. The shooting went on for some time. There was riposte from the Katangans, but they were outgunned and lacked effective leadership. Their mercenary officers were in hiding. The post office was stormed by Indian troops. The Katangans had suffered some casualties but most were taken prisoner…This is how the fighting started in Elisabethville based on my own observations…They tried to grab Tshombe in his palace, but he got away before they could seize him.

There I was, in an upstairs window, watching as tracer bullets pass back and forth in front of me. I watched the spectacle through most of the early morning. The next morning, after the U. Indian troop stormed the Post Office, I came out of the apartment. I remember the apartment house that I was in had… large columns that supported the upper floors. A number of whites had collected sheltering behind the columns. A couple may have been mercenaries…. But nobody had guns that I could see.

Anyway, we were all trying to see what was going on in the Place. Then I went to the Consulate General and helped draft reports on what had happened, including my own observations. We had not known the military action was planned, nor did we expect anything so dramatic…. However, there is no question as to what was going on in terms of the dynamics within the U. The Indians and the Africans, the so-called Bandung group, the Ghanaians, the radical Africans and Asians, had made a deal with us….

And that was that we would enforce the unity of the Congo, against the wishes of our colonialist allies, in return for their support in keeping the U. I know of no documentary evidence, but…I reckon that an informal deal was struck between the Kennedy administration and [Kwame] Nkrumah [leader of Ghana] and [Jawaharlal] Nehru [leader of India].

That day, there were a couple of things that happened. One, the African population began hunting Ba-Lubas. Ba-Lubas are from Kasai and from Northern Katanga. On the contrary, the Ba-Lubas strongly supported the central government. The antagonism stems, at least in part, from the large number of Ba-Lubas that enjoyed well-paid jobs, especially with the copper company.

Groups of young Katangans sought them out, beat them and often killed them. I was walking down the main street of Elisabethville that day when suddenly I saw a man peddling like mad on a bicycle, with a gang of youths chasing him on foot. Finally, one guy caught up to him.

This gent had a bicycle chain attached to a stick that he used like a whip. The chaser then yanked the man backwards off the bicycle. He landed with a sickening thud. The chain had cut into his neck and was strangling him. The gang of assailants then proceeded to kick him to death. We were trying to concentrate the Americans at the consulate and in houses where they would be more accessible, less isolated and in areas away from points of potential conflict.

When they saw our Jeep, they began shooting at us. They mistook it for a U. Anyway, we pulled into a driveway, jumped out of the car, and got into a drainage ditch. When the shooting died down, we went to a neighboring house and knocked on the door.

A young Belgian couple opened the door and let us in. We all took shelter in their cave, in the back of the house as the rate of firing increased. The Katangans soon surrounded the house. They then banged on the door. When the owner opened up, he was told politely that they wanted us to come out of the house.

The man insisted that we were not from the U. We refused to leave the questionable safety of the house. Surprisingly, they did not force the issue or attempt to enter the house. This seemed to satisfy them, and they went away. Just before dusk, we decided to make a run for it. I told Cassilly to take Mrs. Poole and head up the street where I could shelter behind some buildings. They shot at us as we were leaving, but the bullets were high above the top of the Jeep.

Cassilly and Mrs. Poole soon joined me and we returned to her house rather than attempt to cross the town to the consulate. In her apartment, we had no communications. We simply lay on the floor and hoped the random firing would not penetrate the sides of the building.

In the middle of the night, a U. When we had gone missing, the people in the consulate had organized a search party for us fearing that we had been taken prisoner by the Katangans. Fortunately, the convoy was able to escort us to the consulate…. I was in the U. Advising on military operations and on the attitude of the population. I gave firsthand accounts of Katangan military dispositions and on their reaction to the fighting.

I was floating around town, talking to people, moving between the lines. I found a relatively lightly covered back road leading into the U. The Gurkhas [Nepalese and Indian soldiers] would often provide covering fire while I scooted into the camp. It was an incredible situation, and it went on for some two weeks.

Finally, a cease-fire was declared. Indeed, French mercenaries had engineered the capture of Jadotville without firing a shot. They were held as hostage. This had much to do with the acceptance of a hasty cease-fire and the conditions of the cease-fire. A period of uneasy peace followed for some three months.

As time passed, things got more and more tense. Early in December, the consulate organized a large reception. A new consul had been appointed. His name was Hoffacker. He supported Katangan independence and followed a line pushed by the well-financed Katanga lobbying operation in Washington.

Hoffacker invited both Katangans and U. In his naive way, he thought understanding could be furthered by putting the two immediate protagonists together. Since these U. Only limited tactical decision was made in Elisabethville.

Armed groups have recently been active in Katanga, though they do not have overt political platforms, and their generally low-profile operations are not as extensive as those in the Kivus. In some cases, their activities are probably linked to the elite frustrations outlined above and the secessionist sentiments they feed.

It claims to defend the region against exploitation by Kinshasa and reportedly has ties with small secessionist organisations. He was sentenced to death in the DRC has a moratorium on the death penalty.

He escaped in an outbreak of 1, prisoners in Lubumbashi in Hide Footnote It was particularly active in , when, in March, many of its fighters marched into Lubumbashi.

Several well-placed sources and local leaders in Katanga believe the group serves the interests of political and economic elites at the national and provincial levels.

UN Experts, op. Violence could flare up unexpectedly and exacerbate humanitarian problems. The security challenges were compounded by difficult logistics, due to the lack of infrastructure, the fallout of the economic crisis affecting numerous workers and the dire humanitarian situation.

Hide Footnote Dozens of Bakata Katanga have surrendered, giving up weapons. However, few in Lubumbashi believe the group has been defeated; there is fear some politicians keep it in readiness for possible future need. Crisis Group email correspondence, Lubumbashi-based analyst, October These are not the only armed groups that should be a concern.

On 30 December , followers of the self-proclaimed prophet Mukungubila from the same area as Kabila and an unsuccessful candidate in the election attacked the state TV station RTNC , the defence ministry and the national airport, all in Kinshasa.

Reportedly several hundred followers were killed, most in Lubumbashi. Though the motivation of the attacks is still not entirely clear, they illustrate the potential consequences of unaddressed tensions between Katanga and the centre and between Katangan elites. Many observers believe they were an attempt by Lubakat elite to pressure the president and secure their positions in the government and security forces.

Mukungubila published a letter to Kabila on 5 December attacking his decision to name General Charles Bisengimana Rukira to head the PNC, denouncing Rukira for his supposed Rwandan origins and calling on security services to remove the president. Katumbi expressed support for the president. Hide Footnote The failure to address the Bakata Katanga, the opaque nature of the Mukungubila affair and recent accusations against politicians of recruiting or harbouring a militia all point to the continued role of unaccountable armed elements in uncertain political times.

When Mobutu was overthrown in , he went into exile in Zambia, where he was close to the then President Frederick Chiluba and successful in business, especially transport. Katumbi became a Kabila supporter on his return and was elected Katanga governor in by the votes of 94 of the members in the new provincial assembly. Hide Footnote He is an atypical Congolese politician, whose private business fortune, from fisheries, mining and transport, gives him an exceptional degree of independence from the central government.

Katumbi is a charismatic populist and generally credited with a good record as governor. Omasombo, Biographie , op. Close media connections are relatively common for politicians. The presidential family has interests in Digitalcongo, and several other Katangan political leaders own or are close to a TV station. Hide Footnote These, along with a hands-on style, have made him well-known and popular, in Katanga and beyond.

Because the government delayed provincial elections, he was governor for eight years instead of the mandated five. Hide Footnote His tenure coincided with and benefited from the commodity boom, which led to significant infrastructure development in southern Katanga that contrasted, however, with the lack of development elsewhere in the province see above. Over the years, the relationship between the charismatic Katumbi and the more introverted Kabila became increasingly difficult.

In the run-up to the elections, a seemingly disillusioned Katumbi announced he would leave politics. But civil society organisations collected a million signatures on a petition imploring Katumbi to stay. A supporting rally a few weeks before the elections also highlighted the strong Katumbi-Kyungu alliance. Tensions between Katangan leaders and the president escalated dramatically in late when Katumbi, Kyungu and Jean-Claude Muyambo separately took strong public positions against any constitutional amendment that would allow Kabila to stand for a third term.

Muyambo was subsequently imprisoned, officially for an unrelated matter. Muyambo, formerly a Katumbi foe, was president of the Bemba association Sempya , humanitarian affairs minister and president of the Lubumbashi Bar Association. For more, see Crisis Group Report, Congo , op. Muyambo was imprisoned in January and is still in jail.

Kabila reacted during a meeting with the Katangan elite in January , from which Katumbi, Kyungu and Muyambo were absent. Further signs of deteriorating relations came in summer In June, the government reportedly transferred a general file on corruption to the national prosecutor with suggestions that it implicated Katumbi. This was later denied by the prosecutor, and the president appears to have backed away from levelling corruption allegations for now.

Preparing for his new position as a Kabila opponent and with one eye on future elections, Katumbi reached out to international actors and other opposition politicians, including Kamerhe and Tshisekedi. Katumbi reportedly hired a U. The idea was resisted by other opposition parties, fearful of his wealth and influence.

They focused more on guaranteeing credible elections than who would contest them. Hide Footnote Since he left the majority, Katumbi has been close to the G7, and several other groups and parties have rallied to him. On 30 March , the G7 formally asked Katumbi to be a presidential candidate. Hide Footnote Realising that his attempt to inspire broader opposition unity had not worked, Katumbi declared his desire to stand on 4 May. On the same day, Justice Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba announced an investigation into Katumbi for allegedly employing mercenaries.

On June, some Congolese opposition politicians and civil society representatives met in Genval, Belgium. Katumbi was absent, but several close advisers and his brother, Katebe Katoto, attended. It allows Katumbi to operate in close association to the historic opposition leader. The defections of Katumbi and the G7 have considerably weakened the majority in Katanga and especially Lubumbashi, where it has never had to contend with serious opposition.

In early April, the army paraded tanks and armoured vehicles in Lubumbashi. Hide Footnote The central government and PPRD have also reinvigorated attempts to retain support in Katanga, including by encouraging new parties, or factions within existing parties.

However Kyungu was able to produce court documents on 5 February that confirmed his leadership of the party. This campaign included issuing new membership cards to PPRD ministers and deputies. Both Kabila and Katumbi are mobilising and broadening their support. Crisis Group email correspondence, Katangan analyst, August Demonstrations and violence escalated in April and May , when the government accused Katumbi of endangering national security.

He was injured in a protest outside the Lubumbashi courthouse and eventually flew abroad for medical treatment, an avoidance of all-out confrontation that may have suited both sides. He was subsequently convicted in a civil dispute over ownership of property, but the ruling and three-year prison sentence can be challenged, because he was convicted in absentia. Hide Footnote Nevertheless, the government has strong cards to play and is likely to continue to bring legal cases to keep him on the defensive.

The population of Katanga and other opposition parties have stayed quiet through this round of confrontation, but no one thinks the problems have been resolved.

Katumbi does not have old links to armed groups, so the high level of political tension is not linked to the outbreaks of armed violence described above, though some of his allies, in particular UNAFEC, could be involved in street clashes.

The fundamental breakdown of trust between Kinshasa and many Katangan elite and ordinary citizens reflects countrywide discontent with the regime as it tries to delay elections in ever more inventive ways. It also reveals very Katangan concerns about identity, power and entitlement.

Necessary legislation for the effective functioning and budgetary survival of the new provinces has stalled. In October , the government froze transfer of national tax revenue to the provinces and other decentralised entities and announced an audit of all provincial budgets, which may take a long time and create further crises.

All this adds to a growing feeling that decentralisation gains and Katangan identity more widely are under attack. The breakdown in trust and rising tensions risk triggering violent escalation.

The concerns are at local, provincial and national levels. The most significant danger arises when the various tensions feed off each other, as appears to have happened with the Mukungubila incident that triggered violence in both Kinshasa and Katanga. An indication that the government is worried about such dynamics is the increased military presence in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces.

Particularly telling are the deployment of armoured vehicles near Lubumbashi and reinforcements in Kolwezi. As the electoral deadline looms, government and opposition are increasingly focused on their fight to take or retain power and adopting a zero-sum approach. Real dialogue and government commitment not to manipulate the constitution for political purposes would contribute to de-escalating tensions across the country.

This situation is hardly promising for solving problems at local level, but it makes finding a way forward ever more important. These are most likely when local and provincial elections are organised. Responsible leadership is needed from cultural and community leaders and authorities. At the least, national authorities must allow space for local reconciliation initiatives and not take actions that might exacerbate problems.

Politicians on all sides must desist from politicising identity to shore up support bases. The approaching elections necessitate further local action to deal with armed groups. Use of such groups to further political ambitions continues, in Katanga as well as the worse affected Kivus, despite fourteen years of official peace. However, while there has been some serious violence in Katanga over the last five years, and there is reason to believe the armed groups remain a threat, the frequency and intensity of incidents do not yet indicate an explosive situation.

Where possible, disarmament and demobilisation should be carried out, though this needs to be carefully considered and done case by case, so as to not inflame tensions or create perceptions that some communities are being unfairly treated. Its presence in Katanga, though limited, is being beefed-up to deal with a possible upsurge in violence if political tensions continue to rise.

While there are limits to what it can do when national forces confront their own citizens, MONUSCO should continue reinforcing its police component in urban centres, to help with monitoring Congolese police and military in case of urban unrest and to provide security for political officers and human rights monitors.

The Mission is reviewing its military and police deployments in areas at high risk of election-related violence and enhancing its ability to protect UN personnel in urban centres, including Lubumbashi, by developing evacuation plans and deploying helicopters and armoured personnel carriers.

Rising political tensions in Katanga and the country at large coincide with a slump in the mineral export dependent economy. Major export prices are not expected to increase in the near future, leaving little margin to raise revenue other than by tackling corruption and increasing efficiency, but as political competition is patronage based, there is an ever more desperate fight over a shrinking cake. It also dispels hope of quickly operationalising the equalisation fund, so the disparities between provinces will remain.

Crisis Group interview, development official, Kinshasa, March After ten years of tentative decentralisation, which at least shifted some power to provincial assemblies and administrations, recent moves by Kinshasa have reversed the trend. Foreshadowing its probable approach in national elections, the majority has deployed all means at its disposal to ensure that nearly all provincial authorities are subject to its command. It is vital that the government makes the province-centre financial relationship far more transparent.

This should be in conjunction with a financial monitoring mechanism, so that decentralisation does not simply equate to decentralisation of corruption. A more empowered audit office, with better civil society monitoring of financial flows, could help defuse province-centre tensions. Again, the national political climate does not currently lend itself to such progress, but these issues should not be ignored if a better balance is to be found.

Katanga, because of regime ties and its disproportionate economic weight, is one of the key battlegrounds, along with major urban centres such as Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani. The lack of effective development, in particular in its north, and competing individual ambitions have pushed the Katangan elite into a dangerously polarised position.

With resources distributed along patronage networks, it is determined to either keep a grip on central power a determination potentially at odds with national democracy or keep more resources at the provincial level.

Support for Katangan identity is not inherently illegitimate, and prospect of a strong separatist movement is currently remote, but the risk is that politicians will mobilise armed groups and networks to manipulate separatist sentiment for their political ends. Several provincial political leaders have rallied to his camp, but Kabila retains strong Lubakat support, as well as a base in the new Lualaba province.

Whether Katumbi and Kabila will ever contest an election head to head depends on future turns in the unfolding political drama, but if events since Katumbi announced his candidacy are an indication, the battle would be hard fought.

Even now, the confrontation is likely to raise tensions, not just between province and centre, which are connected by multiple overlapping networks, but also by shifting elite alliances. To move the electoral, financial and political issues forward constructively and put in place transitional arrangements for the now inevitable delay of the November polls requires a minimum of trust between the main parties, a more coherent opposition and a step away from winner takes all politics.

Hide Footnote Genuine, credible dialogue is needed, which should include but not be limited to a formal national dialogue. As elsewhere in the vast country, the risks of unpredictable deterioration and renewed violence are real in Katanga.

Now is the time to head them off. Though the government will try hard to keep the international community out of its relations with the new provinces, mediation efforts to bring the main parties in political disputes together should keep the subject on the table. For more information, please see Our Supporters. For a full print version of this report with a list of supporters, please apply to brussels crisisgroup.

The U. Crisis Group analyses the implications. Which armed groups did the U. Last week the U. They recruit mainly local fighters.

Having developed tactical alliances with both senior army officers and armed groups fighting security forces, it both fuels and feeds off an internecine and murky conflict on the ground. In Mozambique, ASWJ formed when frustrated youth, including local petty traders and poor fishermen, began building their own mosques and prayer houses in Cabo Delgado province and challenging established religious leaders they saw as too close to state authorities.

As the police clamped down, they eventually took up arms, launching their first attack in There is some evidence of prior contacts between the two designated groups.

Local observers and officials in the DRC and Mozambique say that there are some known cases of Mozambicans, including some of the leaders of ASWJ, travelling to the DRC for training, but these movements are believed to have ended years ago. The UN refugee agency estimates that more than 1, displaced women were raped before fleeing.

In total nearly , people now live in camps for displaced persons - a huge number, often overshadowed by the even more numerous people forced from their homes by other conflicts in DR Congo. They burn villages and kill people," said Priscille, a Pweto resident. There are several groups of Mai Mai, the term for armed community groups, in Katanga. The Kata Katanga, which in Swahili means "secede Katanga", is the newest and was formed after Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga escaped from prison in September Before he was imprisoned in , he had been head of a militia which fought alongside the Congolese forces against pro-Rwandan rebel groups in the s.

After the end of that conflict, he allegedly continued to receive discreet support from someone in the military. Following his escape, such links are thought to have continued - with top decisions and financing coming from a Katangan living abroad.

A man who recently fled a rebel base with two wives and eight children told the BBC about the group's recruitment process. He told us that if Katanga became independent, it would put an end to the harassment by the soldiers, and would give us access to the resources that belong to us. He told us that would change. The largest cobalt deposits in the world are in Katanga - and the province is the second biggest African provider of copper. While thousands of people walk for days on dusty roads to escape armed groups, other brand-new roads are used to transport millions of dollars' worth of minerals out of the country.

Lorries full of cobalt and copper can be seen every day lining up for kilometres on end at the Zambian border. The skyline of Lubumbashi is dominated by its slag heap, but outside the provincial capital, schools, hospitals and asphalt roads - besides those heading to the border - are rare sights. Lucien, a school teacher from Kabisa now in Pweto, said a dozen men joined up with the separatists from his village.

According to local authorities in Pweto, hundreds of Mai Mai fighters have deserted the movement since the beginning of the year, exhausted and demoralised. We are poorer than before, many of us died," one former fighter said.