Ponce was a composer, educator and scholar of Mexican music. Some of his music was influenced by indigenous Mexican cultures. A period of nationalistic leanings initiated in with the Aztec-themed ballet El fuego nuevo The New Fire , followed by a second ballet, Los cuatro soles The Four Suns , in Parry was born in Wales, but moved to the United States as a child. In his adulthood, he traveled between Wales and America, and performed Welsh songs and glees with Welsh texts in recitals.
He composed the first Welsh opera, Blodwen , in Rhys Best known for the Pomp and Circumstance Marches [ clarification needed ] Moore Stanford wrote five Irish Rhapsodies — He published volumes of Irish folk song arrangements, and his third symphony is titled the Irish symphony. In addition to being heavily influenced by Irish culture and folk music, he was particularly influenced by Johannes Brahms White n.
Mackenzie wrote a Highland Ballad for violin and orchestra , and the Scottish Concerto for piano and orchestra He also composed the Canadian Rhapsody. His music is heavily influenced by Jacobite art White and Murphy , , The article under this title is devoted to Mykola Lysenko who is considered to be the father of Ukrainian classical music.
Hrabovsky assumes that Stanyslav Lyudkevych himself could be considered as significant nationalistic composer and musicologist thanks to his numerous composition under Ukraine-devoted titles as well as numerous paper devoted to use of Ukrainian folk songs and poetry in Ukrainian classical music Lyudkevych Inspiration by Ukrainian folklore could be observed even earlier, particularly in compositions by Maksym Berezovsky — Kornii , , Dmytro Bortnyansky — Kornii , , and Artem Vedel — Kornii , Skip to main content.
Nowhere was this truer than in the Habsburg empire, which was at the beginning of the 19 th century an absolutist state held together through its imperial institutions and the dynastic principle, but whose subjects were divided by numerous languages, religions, and historical traditions , all of which had the potential to serve as the material for nationalist awakening in the wake of To an extent, this apparent fragmenting of imperial rule during the 19 th century along national lines was related to modernization; since nationalism and national identity are closely linked to modernity and modernization, the passing of the Habsburg monarchy into the modern era was also the passing of the traditional means of imperial rule and life and the rise of discrete national forces.
One of the guiding forces behind this re-establishment was Klemens von Metternich , the Austrian chancellor who saw in the French Revolution and its legacy as both a foreign and a domestic threat to the Habsburg Empire. The Great Power rivalries and vested interests tied up with the Eastern Question see below , and the establishment of entrenched and adversarial political and potentially military alliances at the end of the 19 th and beginning of the 20 th century, drastically diminished the common ground upon which the Concert of Europe had once stood.
Nationalism, should it seep into the Habsburg monarchy, threatened to turn the empire from an integral state into a multi-national and fragmented empire. It marked the appearance of vernacular newspapers and reading rooms, for example, as well as early forms of nationalist associational life, sporting and singing societies, and gymnastic organizations. The impact of these initiatives was often very restricted: the actual and indeed potential readership for vernacular newspapers was in most cases very low, given the levels of literacy in certain parts of the monarchy, and membership to nationalist associations was not nearly as high as many activists had hoped.
As Pieter Judson and others have shown, national identity in the 19 th century was very often subordinate, or even non-existent, with people turning instead to local, regional, or other forms of identification. The turmoil of in the Habsburg lands, however, was also an attempt at national revolution, with many of the non-Germanic peoples in the Habsburg Empire calling for some kind of autonomy, even independence. The Austro-Hungarian agreement showed that nationalism was not necessarily an irresistibly corrosive force seeping through the sinews of the Habsburg State.
The Ausgleich complicates the notion, long-held in the historiography of the origins of the First World War, that nation and empire were diametrically opposed forces, irreconcilable to each other and thus bound to clash violently. In the last quarter of the 19 th century, the Habsburg approach of squaring nationalist forces with imperial realities was looking increasingly anachronistic. This was not only because of the ever-greater appeal of nationalism to the subject peoples of the Habsburg Empire; it was also due to the emergence, in quick succession but under very different circumstances, of two powerful new national states onto the European stage: Italy and Germany.
The emergence of Germany, in particular, dramatically altered the balance of power in Europe and changed the nature of international relations in the last quarter of the 19 th century. The unification of Italy, however, came first in , following important military victories for Italian nationalist forces in alliance with imperial France over the Habsburgs at Magenta and Solferino.
Whereas Cavour believed that Piedmont, with its liberal politics and its constitutional monarchy, should serve as the nucleus of the new unitary Italy, enlarging its political system and institutions so as to cover the entire country, Mazzini saw such political traditions as too sterile to ignite the passions of the masses. The unification, achieved with assistance in Sicily from the colourful adventurer and Mazzinian Giuseppe Garibaldi , left a number of matters still unresolved.
There were also many territories coveted by the men of the Risorgimento that remained outside of the unified Italian state: the unredeemed lands, or Italia Irredenta : the Trentino in the Austria Tyrol and various cities and towns on the Adriatic coast, most importantly the key port of Trieste. Of even greater urgency was the fact that, in spite of the political union of Italy, many subjects of the new state did not identify strongly - or indeed at all - with the Italian nation.
The great differences in social and economic fortunes in the various parts of the new state, the prevalence of regional, local, or confessional identities, were all great enemies of the Cavourian and Mazzinian dream of a united and integral Italy.
Both the Cavourian and Mazzinian approaches to state- and nation-building served as inspiration and example to national activists throughout Europe. There was also a Mazzinian legacy. Here was a dream of peaceful coexistence, not of violent confrontation. It was not far removed from the Wilsonian vision that was applied to Europe after the First World War.
Indeed, many Europeans were duly impressed with the vigour of Mazzini and the success of this underground, conspiratorial network. The other great national unification of the second-half of the 19 th century, that of Germany, took place under very different circumstances. Whereas Italy was unified largely through the efforts of the constitutional monarchy of Piedmont-Sardinia, and thus came to adopt the liberal traditions of that state at a national level, the German principalities came together by the force of the largest pre German state, Prussia, and with the political, diplomatic, and military efforts of the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck , Prime Minister from Prussia was a far more conservative state than Piedmont, and a far more conservative state than many of the remaining German principalities, which it dwarfed in terms of political and industrial might.
This class was well represented in the officer corps of the Prussian army, a disproportionately large institution that enjoyed great prestige within the state.
Bismarck, himself the heir of a Junker family, sought to create a strong, unified German state under Prussian auspices, in which the autocratic political tradition from which he hailed would not be too diluted. He was an exponent, then, of the Kleindeutsch solution to the question of German unification, in which the putative German state, once unified, would exclude the Austrian lands and be dominated by Prussia.
Following a series of wars that the Prussian army and government prosecuted successfully from , beginning in Schleswig-Holstein against the Danes , then against Austria in , and finally, most spectacularly, against France in , the unification of the German states was completed. Seen in comparison to the dynamism and potency of the newly unified German national state, Austria-Hungary looked increasingly out of step with the times, which seemed to belong to the likes of Bismarck, Mazzini, Kossuth, to name but some.
The arrival of a powerful industrial state hailed a new balance of power in European international relations: a new force with which the Great Powers would have to reckon.
The new sources of military and industrial power in Europe following the unification of Italy and, especially, Germany, also created a new climate in international relations. The Concert system established by Metternich in the first half of the 19 th century, despite its numerous successes in maintaining an equilibrium in the continent, was looking increasingly incapable of meeting the challenges of the Realpolitik of the late 19 th century and of the more solid and potentially antagonistic alliance blocks which were formed around this time.
The most pressing concern in international relations in the latter part of the 19 th century was the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, a state which was apparently unable to compete in the power politics of the period. Within the Ottoman Empire itself there were a number of national activists who hoped also to capitalize on the declining power of the empire.
Their work, however, was cut out by the social structure of the empire itself. Without the threat and practice of force there were few examples of mass and sustained conversion of Ottoman subject peoples to Islam with notable exceptions in Bosnia, Albania and parts of Bulgaria. The broad confessional categories created and upheld by the Millet system also stymied the development of discrete national identities and national groups, since it divided peoples not by language or territory but by religion.
Thus, national awakeners of the kind we have encountered previously were, in the Ottoman lands, faced with the challenge of disaggregating their putative national group from subject peoples with whom they shared a Millet. This was in addition to the challenges of separating their group from imperial rule itself.
For this reason, the struggles of the national awakeners in the Ottoman lands were waged both against the Ottoman state and against rival programmes of national awakening. This second aspect of the national conflict became ever more pronounced in the last quarter of the 19 th century, since the entropy of Ottoman institutions and rule in Europe was becoming ever more apparent, and nationalists saw the greatest threats to the realization of their goals as coming not from the empire itself, but from other nationalists.
In these parts, an absence of centralized Ottoman control and severe corruption of local administrators created the conditions for a largely spontaneous uprising on the part of the peasant Christian subjects. This uprising, which began in , was directed in the first instance not against Ottoman rule itself, but rather against the Janissaries, the Ottoman military caste who were using their considerable powers to prey upon the local population.
Eventually this transformed from a local dispute against the Janissaries into a more concerted attempt to gain political autonomy from the Ottomans. A subsequent revolt lasted from , and ended with the Porte conceding significant measures of self-government to the Serbs, thus creating the basis for what would become the Serbian national state.
This revolt was inspired by, and related to, the Serbian uprisings of the previous decades, but in many respects it was a more sophisticated and concerted challenge to Ottoman authority. The Greeks had better cultural and political representation than the largely socially undifferentiated Serbs. Notably, the Phanariot Greeks of Constantinople so-called because they were based in the Phanar district of the imperial capital , were able to support and direct the efforts of the Greek revolution from outside its staging ground.
Importantly, the Greek war had the support of France, Britain, and Russia, who, after initial hesitation, intervened militarily on behalf of the Greeks, a decisive factor that led to the creation of an autonomous Greek kingdom in For many enlightened Europeans the national revolutions in the Balkans represented the casting off of oriental and backward Ottoman despotism and the redemption of Christian subjects through national revolution.
Coming so soon after the revolutionary transformations in France, the uprisings in Serbia and Greece were seen by many as an example of the kind of universal and progressive revolution that had taken place in France. This was especially true in the case of the Greek revolution, which was understood by many Westerners as a battle of a once great, classical civilization to throw of the shackles of an infidel and primitive imperial master.
As the 19 th century progressed, the cadres of national awakeners did indeed internalize the ideals of the French Revolution, and hoped that they would be able to enact them among their own peoples and in their own lands.
The Greek War also established the pattern of Great Power intervention and involvement in Ottoman affairs and therefore, also, of Great Power involvement in the Balkan national revolutionary movements, which would continue until For this reason the national revolutions in the Ottoman Balkans were inextricably linked to the foreign policy interests of the Great Powers: they could be made and unmade through the sponsorship and support of one or more of the Great Powers.
The confluence of foreign, Great Power interests and native revolution can be seen during an uprising of Christian peasants in Ottoman Bosnia which quickly spread to Serbia and Bulgaria, becoming a matter of international concern and foreign intervention when Russia declared war on the Ottomans in The significance of the Treaty of Berlin is great and varied: the settlement was, in a sense, a blueprint for the settlements that would decide the borders in central and Eastern Europe after the First World War.
They established the nation-state as the principle of post-Ottoman political organization in the region, just as the Paris peace treaties at the end of the First World War established nation-states as the principle of post-Habsburg political organization.
They also enhanced the rivalries of the Balkan states themselves, creating overlapping territorial claims and the tantalizing prospect that still more gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire would be tolerated and perhaps even encouraged.
Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian nationalists all coveted Ottoman lands in Macedonia and Thrace, and each now attempted to stake a claim on these lands through the promotion of cultural work, including the establishment of churches and schools , and so on. We have already seen that the ascendant forces of nationalism in the second half of the 19 th century called into question the very fundamentals of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires, namely, the dynastic principle and the possibility of a state being able to contain numerous national groups within a single imperial framework.
This population, in fact, had expanded in the aftermath of the Bosnian uprising and the Treaty of Berlin. The settlement of had called for the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as it became known after the Berlin Treaty , still de jure a province of the Ottoman Empire, by Austria-Hungary.
After the Austro-Hungarian army waged a costly military campaign to bring the region under imperial control, the monarchy set out its long-term occupation goals in Bosnia. Its chief concerns were the rising tides of Croatian, and especially Serbian nationalist sentiment, among the Catholic and Orthodox Christian populations within Bosnia, which would compete with imperial attempts to win the loyalty of the population. This, in fact, was an attempt to synthesize nationalist forces with imperial interests.
This, in turn, introduced new tensions into the Eastern Question, as now Austria-Hungary was faced with a potentially antagonistic neighbour with designs on imperial territories in Bosnia, and which enjoyed the support of Russia, a great rival to Austro-Hungarian interests in the region.
With this largely achieved, pre-existing rivalries between the Balkan states once again came to the fore. A particularly severe dispute soon opened up between Serbia and Bulgaria over which country was entitled to territories in Macedonia that were claimed by both states.
The dispute showed how inter-communal rivalries, that is, rivalries between the Christian Balkan states themselves, were just as important on the eve of the First World War as were rivalries between nation-states and empire.
Serbia, on the other hand, emerged from the two Balkan wars greatly expanded, almost doubling the size of its territory and leaving only Habsburg Bosnia among the its un-redeemed territories. The political leaders of Serbia, their state replete in victory and their army spent on the battlefield, would have looked forward to a period of consolidation and preparation for future expansion. However, such patience was not a characteristic of certain militarist and youth groups in the South Slav lands.
The fruits of their collaborations fell in Sarajevo, June , and with consequences felt by the entire world. There can be no doubt that nationalism was a potent political force in 19 th century Europe: a means of mass mobilization embraced by many millions of people; an ideology of transformation and revolution born in the French Revolution, intrinsically linked to the rapid modernization of the continent, whose spread threatened to alter the political, social, and cultural landscape of Europe.
The political map of Europe in the 21 st century has changed, but it is not beyond recognition when held alongside the political map of
0コメント